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TAX-SUPPORTED
ABORTIONS: THE
LEGAL ISSUES
EUGENE J. SCHULTE*
The tradition of the United States Supreme Court in the immediate
aftermath of its many so-called "landmark" decisions has manifested itself
in two mutually exclusive patterns. Either the landmark decision has indi-
cated the high water mark of a particular legal theory or in the alternative,
the decision has proven to be the jumping-off point for its further exten-
sion. With respect to the Supreme Court's companion abortion decisions
of 1973,1 the course of further development is not, as yet, completely clear.
Nevertheless, some indications are apparent.
While most anti-abortion forces have concentrated on the rather nebu-
lous goal of implementing a constitutional Right-to-Life amendment, other
agencies have continued to concentrate on the courts in an attempt to keep
the impact of these abortion decisions within the narrowest possible con-
fines. The success of these efforts, to date, has been only slightly encourag-
ing. Publicly owned hospitals have been obligated to provide abortion and
sterilization services.! Many private hospitals are being pressured into
abandoning their anti-abortion positions3 and have opened their doors to
these procedures. Even religiously affiliated hospitals have been subjected
to legal attack and are currently engaged in several lawsuits to defend their
right to stand for life.'
Perhaps the most meaningful legal battle being waged is the one over
*A.B. 1965, J.D. 1969, University of Detroit.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
2 Doe v. Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974); Doe v. Poelker, 497 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir.
1974); Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974); Hathway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475
F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973); Doe v. Mundy, 378 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
1 On July 12, 1974, the Women's Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union, 22 East 40th
Street, New York, N.Y. 10016, released a memorandum with attached model complaints and
affidavits, entitled: "Lawsuits Against Private Hospitals Which Refuse to Perform/Permit
Abortions."
I Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Bellin
Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973); Portman v. Suburban Hosp., No. B-74-591 (D.
Md., Jan. 6, 1975); Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973); Watkins
v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973); Allen v. Sisters of St. Joseph,
361 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Tex. 1973), dismissed as moot per curiam, 490 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.
1974); Ham v. Holy Rosary Hosp., 529 P.2d 361 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1974); Simon v. Holy Cross
Hosp., Eq. No. 50,440 (Montgomery County Cir. Ct. Md., pending).
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the question of who is to pay for abortions and sterilizations. During the
1973-1974 fiscal year, an estimated $50,000,000 in federal tax money was
used to provide more than 250,000 abortions. 5 Additional funding for these
services was provided through state and local welfare programs.' The com-
ing of national health insurance can only magnify these figures as coverage
is extended beyond today's more limited welfare recipient categories.7
The pro-abortion forces have used an array of legal devices within the
court system in order to open up more and more channels of "free" access
to abortion. Not only must abortion be decriminalized,' but, if necessary,
every available element within our society must be coerced to contribute
to or assist in the provision of these services. The presence of a religious
hospital evidencing concern for life is anathema to these people. Doctors
and nurses, who have been trained in federally financed facilities, may not
be permitted to refuse them.' Their own neoreligion of nonlife must be
supported by the government as primary. The particular legal arguments
Dr. Louis Hellman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), has estimated that Medicaid spent $40 to $50
million on between 222,000 and 278,000 abortions during the Government's fiscal year 1973.
This amount constituted 90% of the cost of such abortions pursuant to the provisions of 42
U.S.C. § 1396(a)(5) (Supp. III, 1973), which authorizes such percentage of federal copayment
for "family planning services and supplies."
Under new HEW regulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,919 (1974), the Department has indicated
that it will no longer treat abortion as family planning but as a general medical-surgical
service, thus reducing the federal contribution to a 50% level. Various pro-abortion organiza-
tions have announced their intent to challenge this change in the courts.
I Several federal courts, both at the district and the appellate levels, have ordered state and
local welfare offices to fund abortion services for the various assistance groups. See Wulff v.
Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 505 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1974);
Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1974); Roe. v. Ferguson, F. Supp. - (S.D. Ohio
1974); Doe v. Ceci, 384 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D.
1974); Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974).
1 All the leading national health insurance bills introduced into the 94th Congress anticipate
a "universal" program of coverage for every American citizen and every resident of the United
States.
I The declaratory relief sought by the plaintiffs in Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex.
1970), modified, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was to have a determination made of the constitution-
ality of the Texas criminal abortion statute and to enjoin this enforcement as against the
plaintiff and her physician. Similar action was sought in Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048
(W.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd as modified, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), as to the modified Georgia criminal
code. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1201-03 (1968), as amended, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1201-04
(Supp. 1974).
I Bills have been introduced into the state legislatures of Oregon, Florida, and Wisconsin
which would have the effect of limiting the licenses of physicians, nurses, and other health
personnel who repeatedly fail to respond to requests for abortion services. In Wisconsin, bills
were introduced into the 1973 legislature which would have defined "immoral and unprofes-
sional" conduct in the practice of medicine to include "refusing, on grounds of religious belief,
morality or ethics, to perform an operation to remove a human embryo or human fetus from
any person .... ." Wis. A. 58 (1973). Violation of this provision would have required the
permanent revocation of the medical license.
TAX-SUPPORTED ABORTIONS
advanced by these abortion proponents rely on three concepts: due process,
equal protection, and statutory claims to abortion.
DUE PROCESS
An argument, periodically raised, but never fully supported by the
courts, has been that individuals may assert a right to implementation of
constitutional rights, a right to have rights, so to speak. This basic argu-
ment would hold, absent any other conditions, that the federal government
can require the states to not only not prohibit abortions, but to affirma-
tively promote them to the extent of paying for the services on a universal
basis. Unfortunately, this argument, while tenuous, need not be fully in-
voked by the pro-abortionists. All fifty states now participate in the
federal-state Medicaid program.'" Thus, government has already initiated
the possibility of a condition which may be utilized to wedge open the door
to governmental payment for abortions. A long series of Supreme Court
decisions has already cleared the way for this argument: a state may not
condition statutory entitlements upon forfeiture of constitutional rights."
Pro-abortionists argue that the Medicaid program pays for medical-
surgical procedures which are necessary for the health and physical well-
being of eligible participants. If the state was to limit an individual's
participation in the program relative to abortion, it would be conditioning
the receipt of this statutory benefit upon the forfeiture of the patient's
newly established constitutional right to have an abortion. Thus, the
"Catch-22" of constitutional law has been invoked.'2
The one major presupposition of the pro-abortionist in this argument
is that the Supreme Court has raised abortion to the level of a positive
constitutional right. While there are many things that can be said about
the January 22, 1973 decisions, Roe v. Wade" and Doe v. Bolton,'4 the one
thing that can never be admitted is that the Court did anything more than
decriminalize a theretofore forbidden act and set up limitations beyond
which the state could not interfere. There is neither a reference nor even a
suggestion that the state would now be obligated to embark on a positive
program to implement abortion.'5
10 Arizona, the last holdout, will officially begin participation in the program October 1, 1975.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-291 et. seq. (Supp. 1974).
1 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment compensation); Slochower v.
Board of Educ. 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (public employment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958) (tax exemption).
11 In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Supreme Court invalidated state resi-
dency requirements as a pre-condition for the receipt of welfare benefits. Procedural require-
ments could not be used to unconstitutionally burden the poor from moving interstate.
.3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
' Id. at 179.
The "right to privacy," which the Supreme Court has now said includes the right of a
pregnant woman to choose abortion in consultation with her physician had been enunciated
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One possible door is left open to the individual states in this respect.
The question of abortion-on-demand versus abortion-for- medical-
necessity may be legitimately raised. Most state Medicaid regulations pro-
vide that payment will be made only for "medically necessary" procedures,
and nearly all private commercial health insurers and Blue Cross/Blue
Shield have a similar restriction. Thus, such items as noncongenital cos-
metic surgery, experimental surgery, breast augmentations, etc., are not
reimbursable under these payment programs. In Klein v. Nassau County
Medical Center,6 a federal district court invalidated a New York State
Medicaid requirement which limited reimbursement to "medically neces-
sary" procedures. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was remanded
in a per curiam decision for reconsideration by the lower court. 7 Appar-
ently, all that the state could demand would be a "bare assertion" by the
treating physician that the procedure was medically necessary: small com-
fort to those as yet unborn children, but, nevertheless, not an qntirely
"green light" to pro-abortionists.
EQUAL PROTECTION
A much more formidable and, so far, effective pro-abortion argument
has been the contention that the exclusion of abortion and sterilization
benefits from Medicaid results in the creation of two classes of welfare
recipients: those seeking abortions or sterilizations and those seeking other
medical-surgical procedures of similar complexity, including, most impor-
tantly, the obstetrical delivery itself.'8 Assuming the state has some sort
of positive obligation to assist in obtaining abortions, this equal protection
argument may require that the state treat both categories the same. If
benefits are to be denied, the state must first show a compelling state
interest superceding the right of the patient. As a practical matter, such
an interest would be almost impossible to construct and would immedi-
ately subject the state to the Roe v. Wade holding of non-state interfer-
ence. 9
by the Court in other cases involving socially ambivalent behavior. See Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (artificial contraception in the unmarried relationship); Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (possession of pornography in the home for personal use); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (birth control in the marriage relationship).
"1 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
17 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
1 In Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1974), vacated, 505 F.2d 186 (2d Cir.
1974), a special three-judge federal panel had held that once a state had chosen to pay for
medical services rendered in connection with the pregnancies of some indigent women, i.e.,
the actual obstetrical delivery, it could not thereafter refuse to pay for voluntary nonthera-
peutic abortions in connection with the pregnancies of other indigent women.
19 [Tihe attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy
TAX-SUPPORTED ABORTIONS
In addition to the argument that exclusion of abortion from Medicaid
results in the creation of two classes of welfare recipients, a less effective
argument raised by the pro-abortion forces has been that the state's refusal
to pay for abortions results in an unconstitutional distinction between
those able to afford private abortions and those too poor to pay the cost of
such services.2 The Supreme Court's acceptance of this argument, espe-
cially as it is presently constituted, would set a dangerous precedent for
areas other than abortion.2' Nevertheless, pro-abortion forces will make
every use they can of some of the extrinsic logic contained in the premise.
Emotional factors alone can sway a court which is otherwise undecided.
The trial court judge in the Klein case used some of this "discrimination
against the poor" theory in his decision.22
The advent of national health insurance will have a tremendous im-
pact on this argument. Once the affirmative obligation of the state to
provide health care has been firmly established, any limitation imposed
by the state on any type or category of health care will become constitu-
tionally suspect. Even in a system which pays lipservice to the voluntary
and private nature of health care delivery, the due process and equal
protection arguments gain added weight as government intervention and
involvement increase."
should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by
an abortion free of interference by the State.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (emphasis added).
" Other cases discussing the question of "ability to pay" for constitutionally guaranteed
protections and requiring the state to provide such services to the indigent in the criminal
law area include: Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (counsel on appeal); Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (transcripts); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (tran-
scripts for counsel on appeal); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel on appeal);
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (court filing fees); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(transcripts and filing fees).
21 The Supreme Court has been very reluctant to abolish other financial barriers to the poor.
In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court held that divorce court fees must
be waived for properly certified indigents. Subsequent cases have severly limited any further
extensions into other areas. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (denied in
forma pauperis access to the bankruptcy courts); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973)
(denied waiver of appellate court costs for civil appeal).
In both Kras and Schwab the Court spoke of the denial, due to poverty, of fundamental
rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Such lines are artificial and once crossed, become
almost limitless. If the state becomes obligated to provide all basic services to the poor, the
definition of "basic" will be subject to great variations based upon our society's goals and
norms. Such fluctuations are not generally considered a proper subject for the courts, but are
better dealt with by the legislature.
2 An essential ingredient of the court's determination that the state's refusal to fund volun-
tary abortions amounted to a denial of equal protection was the finding that such a refusal
discriminated between poor and nonpoor women. Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center,
347 F. Supp. 496, 500-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
2 One trial court judge recently summed up the general popular attitude toward institutional
health care delivery in the following terms: "It is my conclusion that private hospitals are
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STATUTORY CLAIMS TO ABORTION
Presently, pro-abortion forces have an array of federal and state legis-
lation in the health care field which they use to support their claims to
government-financed abortions. The aforementioned Medicaid program is
replete with provisions and enforcement regulations which, it can be
argued, demonstrate the obligation of the government to provide free abor-
tion and sterilization services. 4 Despite the fact that the states are given
a tremendous amount of individual leeway in establishing and implement-
ing their Medicaid programs,2" certain "basics" are required in order to
assure federal participation. One area in particular, family planning serv-
ices, has been singled out for emphasis.
Family planning services were originally considered an optional bene-
fit to be provided under Medicaid at an individual state's discretion. With
the enactment of the comprehensive 1972 Medicaid and Social Security
amendments," these services became a mandatory part of Medicaid.2 7 To
the pro-abortionist, there is no question that family planning services in-
clude abortion. The fact that a congressional proscription against abortion
was included in the amendments to Title VIII of the Public Health Serv-
ices Act" hardly deters them.29 They simply point out the recent failure of
an anti-abortion amendment to the pending Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW) appropriations bill.30
likewise not 'governmental in nature.' Unlike fire departments and police departments ...
hospitals are not traditionally governmental. Private hospitals are the rule rather than the
exception." Barrett v. United Hospital, 376 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). How long that
traditional attitude will remain in effect is, of course, the subject of much current debate.
24 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13), 1396a(a)(1)-(5) (1970), wherein each state desiring to
participate in the program is required to provide a minimum level of basic services, including
physician and surgical services.
11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), (14), (17), 1396d(a),(b),(c) (1970), wherein each participat-
ing state is permitted to limit certain aspects of the program as benefits its own needs. Among
the areas subject to limitation are the types of services covered, the duration of hospitaliza-
tion, and the percentage of state payment for each service rendered.
28 Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (Supp. II, 1972).
42 U.S.C. § 300a(6) (1970).
In addition, many abortion proponents argue that the failure of Congress to include a
similar specific prohibition on abortion spending in the Medicaid law implies that Congress
intended abortion to be a Medicaid benefit. See Butler, The Right to Abortion Under
Medicaid, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 713 (1974).
'1 On September 17, 1974, the U.S. Senate adopted a floor amendment sponsored by Senator
Bartlett of Oklahoma prohibiting the use of any HEW funds "directly or indirectly to pay
for or encourage the performance of abortions except such abortions as are necessary to save
the life of the mother." Proposed Amend. No. 1859 to H.R. 15,580, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
appearing in 120 CONG. REC. S16,832 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1974). The conference committee
appointed by the full House and Senate rejected this addition in the final bill reported for
passage by both houses.
TAX-SUPPORTED ABORTIONS
This failure to sustain a limitation on abortion evidences one of the
principal hazards facing the Right-to-Life adherents. Now, instead of hav-
ing a piece of legislation completely neutral on the subject, there is a bill
which has a strong legislative history of rejecting the anti-abortion posi-
tion. Failure to enact a legislative program is regularly construed by courts
as evidence of legislative intent. This may occur even if such a result was
not originally intended.
An effort is now being mounted by the anti-abortion forces to exclude
elective abortions from the list of services covered under any future na-
tional health insurance program. If not in the legislation itself, then in the
subsequent battles which will provide the final determination, pro-
abortion forces have an unwilling but very cooperative ally in fending off
such an exclusion. Church-related social action agencies in their enthusi-
asm for a strong and comprehensive universal national health program are
playing right into the hands of those wishing to extend abortion. Given the
current trends in constitutional law, the wider scope of benefits and the
more "federal" the program becomes, the more difficult it will be to limit
the coverage. Not only will the battle for life be lost in this forum, but the
continued independence of Church-related hospitals and other health care
facilities will be seriously endangered.
CONCLUSION
Despite the efforts of anti-abortion forces to adopt a national constitu-
tional amendment, the major arena in which the future of the abortion
issue will be decided is still the courts. Whether or not the Wade and
Bolton decisions will be expanded or limited is subject to judicial mandate.
Early indications are that the pro-abortionists have gained an advantage
in expanding federally financed abortion services. Anti-abortion forces are
handicapped by the loss of many potential allies who, in their zeal for
admirable social goals, have created constitutional and legal roadblocks to
limiting abortion. The loss of any private impact on health care delivery
is concurrent with the expansion of abortion and the federal guarantee of
health care including, as a necessary consequence, abortion services.
